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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
INCOME TAX-DEDUCTION FOR WORTHLESS DEBT-GOD FAITH
OF TAXPAYER IN ASCERTAINING WORTHLESSNESS.-In 1928 tax-
payer purchased $100,000 worth of six percent gold debentures issued
to finance the construction of a hotel. The hotel corporation had
also issued first mortgage leasehold sinking fund bonds, senior in
every respect to those debentures issued to the taxpayer and which
were the first and only lien on the hotel property. The sole security
back of taxpayer's bonds were those assets of the corporation which
were not covered by the security given for the senior bond issue.
In 1931, upon default in interest payments, a mortgage bondholder's
committee was organized and foreclosure proceedings were instituted
by the trustee named in the mortgage. In March of 1942 the cor-
poration filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. In June of the
same year a plan of reorganization was proposed, forming a new
corporation to purchase the hotel. Bondholders of the taxpayer's
class were invited to participate by investing new capital up to ten
percent of their previous investment in exchange for certain se-
curities. The taxpayer never entered into this reorganization plan
but kept his debentures. When a substantial deficiency resulted,
following court approval of the plan and confirmation of the referee's
report of the foreclosure sale in 1933, he entered the purchase price
of the bonds in his 1933 income tax return as a deduction for a
worthless debt. The State Tax Commission disallowed the deduc-
tion on the ground that the debt had become worthless during the
previous year or following the judgment of foreclosure and sale.
Held, order of the Appellate Division reversed; determination of the
State Tax Commission annulled. Under Section 360, subdivision 7,1
of the Tax Law, it is the taxpayer provided he acted in good faith,
and not the Tax Commission, who may ascertain whether a debt
has become worthless and when it is to be charged off.2 It was
apparent that taxpayer had not conclusively lost all chance to recoup
until court approval of the plan of reorganization and confirmation
of the referee's report of sale in 1933. Further, there was evidence
tending to show taxpayer's good faith in discussing with his financial
adviser the possibility of including the item in his 1932 return, and
deciding to wait for the final word of the court on the reorganiza-
tion plan before charging off the debt. In re Charles C. Huitt, as
executor of Finley J. Shepard, deceased v. Carroll E. Mealey, et al.,
292 N. Y. 52 (1944).
In interpreting the worthless debt clause of the New York State
Income Tax Law, the court has followed rulings of the federal courts
in construing similar federal statutes. The "good faith" requirement
of the statute allowing deduction for bad debts is satisfied as long
I N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 214, § 1, says that in computing net income there
shall be allowed as deductions: ". . . Debts ascertained to be worthless and
charged off within the taxable year."
2 People ex rel. Central Union Trust Co. v. Loughman, 249 N. Y. 409, 164
N. E. 333 (1928).
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as it sufficiently appears that taxpayer did not act with a view to
defeat the intent and purposes of the tax law.3 It has been held
that the test of the good faith of the taxpayer is whether a prudent
business man would have acted as the taxpayer did in ascertaining
the worthlessness of the debt. 4 Although the debt must be deducted
in the year in which the taxpayer ascertains it to be worthless, the
law does not impose upon the taxpayer the absolute risk of selecting
the year when it actually becomes so.5 The real question is not when
did the debt become worthless, but when did the taxpayer ascertain
it to be worthless.6 In answering that question the taxpayer must
be allowed a fair degree of latitude.7
J. L. G.
LIMITATIONS-INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-INVALIDITY OF
AGREEMENT BY SHIPPER NOT TO PLEAD.-Respondent, carrier, sued
to recover the amount of freight charges on twenty-one carloads
shipped by petitioner over its own and connecting carriers' lines.
The issue is whether the action was brought in time under Section
16(3) (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act which provided: "All ac-
tions at law by.carriers subject to this Act for recovery of their
charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three years from
the time the cause of action accrues, and not after." Three days be-
fore the expiration of the term allowed, the petitioner agreed not
to plead in any suit the defense of any general or special statute of
limitations in consideration of respondent's forbearance to sue for a
specified time. Two months later, respondent brought this action.
Petitioner contends that the statute prohibits maintenance of the action
notwithstanding its agreement. Respondent insists that the act has
merely modified its common-law contractual right and that the pro-
vision may be waived, and it attempts to distinguish between cases
like this one and others in which- the shipper sues the carrier to
recover excess charges paid or damages for the charging of unreason-
able rates.' Held, the agreement is invalid as being contrary to the
intent and effect of the section and the Act. The primary intention
3 Moore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 101 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939).
4 Peyton Du-Pont Securities Co. v. Com'r, 66 F. (2d) 718 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
5 Rosenthal v. Helvering, 124 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).6 Jones v. Com'r, 38 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
7 Blair v. Com'r, 91 F. (2d) 992 (C. C.-A. 2d, 1937).
I A. J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk Western Ry., 236 U. S. 662, 35 Sup. Ct.
444 (1915). There the Court held that the objection to the timeliness of the
shipper's suit was properly raised b, demurrer and said: "the lapse of time
destroys the liability." See Galveston H. & S. Ry. v. Webster, 27 F. (2d)
765, 124 P. (2d) 906 (1928) ; Kansas City Southern R. R. v. Wolf, 261 U. S.
133, 43 Sup. Ct. 259 (1923).
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